Why does Saudi Arabia want a civil nuclear deal with the US?

 

Why does Saudi Arabia want a civil nuclear deal with the US?

Saudi Arabia and the United States are discussing a deal to cooperate on the kingdom's ambitions to develop a civil nuclear industry, talks that have long been complicated by regional politics and concerns over weapons proliferation.

See also:Britain Set to Sign First Deal to Cut Trump-era Tariffs in Historic Trade Breakthrough

WHY DOES SAUDI ARABIA WANT A NUCLEAR PROGRAMME?

As the world’s largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia may not seem an obvious candidate for nuclear power, but it aims to reduce carbon emissions and free up crude for export under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 economic plan. 

The U.S. Energy Information Administration stated last year that 68% of Saudi electricity was generated by burning gas, and 32% by burning oil, with about 1.4 million barrels of crude used daily for power during peak months like June. 

Atomic power could displace some of that reliance, especially for energy-intensive water desalination and air conditioning, allowing the kingdom to earn more from oil exports. 

However, Saudi Arabia has also declared that if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, it would follow suit—primarily aiming to pressure Tehran, but also fueling concerns about its own ambitions. 

In January, Saudi Arabia announced it would enrich uranium—an activity that can be associated with civilian energy or military development—to produce 'yellowcake' fuel for nuclear power, which it could potentially sell. 

Any deal with Washington would likely include safeguards to address concerns over military ambitions, complementing Saudi Arabia’s commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) not to pursue nuclear weapons.

WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE UNITED STATES?

The deal could offer strategic and commercial benefits. 

Civil nuclear cooperation has historically been a key part of U.S. efforts—along with security guarantees—to facilitate normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Although those diplomatic issues are now separate, a nuclear agreement could serve as a diplomatic incentive or “sweetener.” Riyadh has maintained that it will not normalize relations with Israel without Palestinian statehood.

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wray (not Wright) met with Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman in April, suggesting that both countries are on "a pathway" to a civil nuclear deal. No mention was made of broader normalization issues. 

A formal agreement could position U.S. industry to secure contracts for building Saudi nuclear plants, and give Washington insight into the kingdom’s nuclear activities—helping prevent proliferation of weapons-grade materials. 

Under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the U.S. can negotiate agreements for civil nuclear cooperation, provided certain nonproliferation criteria are met. These agreements are subject to congressional review.

SAUDI ARABIA HAS OPTIONS

If negotiations with the U.S. falter, Saudi Arabia has potential partners to consider:

• China: China National Nuclear Corp (CNNC) reportedly bid in 2023 to build a nuclear plant.

• Russia: Rosatom, which constructed a reactor in Egypt, has signed preliminary cooperation agreements with Riyadh.

• South Korea: Experienced in reactor construction, notably in the UAE.

• France: Also a major supplier of nuclear technology.

The selection will depend on technological capabilities, financing arrangements, and geopolitical considerations, especially regarding nuclear fuel management.

URANIUM ENRICHMENT

A critical issue is whether the U.S. would authorize Saudi Arabia to build and operate a uranium enrichment facility within the kingdom, and under what safeguards. Without strict controls, Riyadh—possessing uranium ore reserves—could theoretically produce highly enriched uranium usable for weapons if enough purification occurs.

Questions also include whether Riyadh would invest in a U.S. or foreign-built enrichment plant and to what extent U.S. companies would be involved in constructing Saudi reactors.

Diplomatically, opposition from Israel, which views an independent Saudi nuclear program with suspicion, remains a significant obstacle. Israel has repeatedly voiced concerns about proliferation risks from a Saudi civilian nuclear industry.